There is a growing literature on the consequences of inequality with regard to political participation. A core finding of this literature is that inequality on the macro level of societies aggravates the stratifying impact of income on individual propensity to vote. What has not been studied so far is whether macro level variables also influence the relationship between educational background and political participation on the micro level. In this paper, we make two claims based on a broad variety of international surveys of advanced industrial democracies: First, educational inequality is an important factor exacerbating the stratifying impact of educational background on participation. Education-related inequalities in voting participation are more pronounced in countries with a more inegalitarian education system. With regard to the impact of education on participation, the impact of educational inequality is also more important than the impact of socio-economic inequality. Second, inspired by the Varieties of Capitalism debate, we argue and show empirically that the degree of economic coordination has implications for the impact of education on participation. Individuals with a vocational education are more likely to participate politically in coordinated than in liberal market economies.
Introduction
There is a large and growing literature on the institutional and political factors causing differences in socio-economic inequality across countries. Popular topics in this field of research are, for example, the impact of the power of the left (Bradley et al. 2003; Rueda 2008) , varieties of capitalism (Pontusson et al. 2002; Rueda/Pontusson 2000) , collective wage bargaining (Wallerstein 1999) What has not been studied so far is whether macro level variables also influence the relationship between educational background and political participation on the micro level. In addition to levels of inequality, we are also interested in studying whether the institutional set-up of the education and training system as well as the political economy in general has consequences with regard to differences in political participation. More specifically, we make two claims: First, educational inequality is an important factor exacerbating the stratifying impact of educational background on participation.
Education-related inequalities in voting participation are more pronounced in countries with a more inegalitarian education system. With regard to the impact of education on participation, the impact of educational inequality is also more important than the impact of socio-economic inequality. Second, inspired by the Varieties of Capitalism debate, we argue and show empirically that the degree of economic coordination has implications for the impact of education on participation. Individuals with a vocational 3 education are more likely to participate in coordinated than in liberal market economies.
Section 2 presents the existing body of knowledge and our theoretical framework.
Section 3 entails the general statistical techniques and the data. Section 4 includes the empirical analyses of the European Values Survey with a very diverse set of countries and nuanced measurement of educational differences in participation. Section 5 imitates the analysis for the European Social Survey for four waves between 2002 and 2008 with a better-quality international survey with more time points per country, but a coarser operationalization of educational inequalities. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review and theory
Our paper draws on three different strands of literature. The first is scholarship on the relationship between education, democracy and political participation. In general, there is considerable evidence -both for the macro as well as the micro level -of a positive and mutually reinforcing association between education and democracy. Kamens (1988) , for example, argues that educational expansion, even at the primary level, supports the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions. More recently, Ansell (2010) posits that causality runs the other way round, i.e. democracies are more likely than autocracies to promote the expansion of education, in particular primary education (see also Baum and Lake 2003 , Brown and Hunter 2004 , Stasavage 2005 .
Linking the macro with the micro level, Mettler (2004) shows that the additional provision of college education to home-coming soldiers after WWII by means of the G.I.
Bill in the United States significantly increased levels of political participation in that particular generation. Studies of voting behavior and political participation have repeatedly shown that higher levels of education are strongly associated with higher 4 levels of political participation, although there is some disagreement on the exact mechanisms behind this association (Brady et al. 1995; Galston 2001; Hillygus 2005; Kam and Palmer 2008) .
This literature has two shortcomings that we would like to address in this paper. First, it does not (or rarely) distinguish between different kinds of education. Usually, education is measured in terms of the size of a given stock of human capital (e.g. years of education, level of education). Some scholars point out that the content of education should matter as well, i.e. the provision of civic education bolsters participation to a stronger extent than being educated in "non-political" subjects such as physics (Galston 2001; Hillygus 2005) . A different kind of distinction, which can be taken from the comparative political economy literature (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001 , Hall and Soskice 2001 , is that between general and specific skills, i.e. between academic and vocational skills. This also points to a second shortcoming of the literature, namely the lack of taking into account cross-country differences in the institutional set-up of education systems and their implied skills formation. This is an important point, because it relates to the question of comparability of different stocks of human capital across countries.
The second literature that the present paper addresses lies at the intersection between political economy and participation research. Anderson and Beramendi (2008) , Anderson and Singer (2008) as well as Schäfer (2010) find that levels of socio-economic inequality in a given societal context have implications for individual political participation. In particular, high levels of inequality exacerbate income-related differences in participation on the micro level. When inequality is high, the participation of low-income people is depressed, which may reinforce existing levels of inequality on the macro level (Mahler 2008, Pontusson and Rueda 2010) . Thus, this literature identifies very important feedback effects between macro-institutional contexts and the dynamics of participation and preference formation on the micro level. What is missing in this field of research, however, is the link to education. The works cited above focus on the effect of income on participation on the micro level and, accordingly, inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth on the macro level. Extending this line of thought, it could be assumed that the distribution of educational resources on the macro level -as a consequence of the institutional set-up of the education system -will have implications for the impact of education on participation on the micro level as well.
The third building block of our argument can be traced back to the seminal contribution of Estévez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001) . They argue and show empirically in the form of a bivariate scatterplot that the extensiveness of vocational education and training is related to levels of wage inequality. In countries with extensive vocational training opportunities, those in the lower half of the distribution of academic skills have access to well-paid and secure employment on the intermediate skill level. In contrast, countries with a focus on academic education promote the polarization of skills in the education system as well as the polarization of job opportunities on the labor market and therefore higher levels of inequality. Various scholars have tested this hypothesis since its original publication, producing mixed results. Bradley et al. (2003) could not find evidence for a negative impact of vocational education on inequality, whereas Kenworthy's (2005) as well as Busemeyer and Iversen's (2012) analyses yield more support.
Tying these three strands together, our argument is the following: in line with the majority of scholars, we trivially expect a positive impact of education on political participation on the micro level (Brady et al. 1995) . However, we anticipate the microlevel effect of education to vary in line with the institutional set-up of the education 6 system and the political economy, which influence the kind of skills that are abundant in a given economy as well as the distribution of human capital.
The relative distribution of different kinds of human capital and the openness of access to these forms of education have important implications for the identity and selfperception of individuals as political beings. Here, we largely follow the resource model developed in Brady et al. (1995) . Access to human capital is an important resource, providing understanding an skills, promoting political participation. Above and beyond that, educational and politico-economic institutions have important feedback effects on the individuals' "psychological engagement with politics" (ibid.: 271) as well as the nature and extensiveness of social networks, which have been found to be very important determinants of participation (Abrams et al. 2010 ).
This general claim can be substantiated in the form of two hypotheses: The first is related to the impact of educational inequality. In elitist education systems, where access to higher levels of education is limited and educational performance depends strongly on parental background, educational background is likely to have a more stratifying impact on participation than in egalitarian education systems. High levels of educational stratification, promoted e.g. in education systems with early tracking of students, are expected to lead to the formation of different education-related social networks. For the highly educated, these networks will have a participation-enhancing effect, whereas for the low-skilled, the opposite is to be expected. The overall effect is an increase in education-related inequalities in participation. In other words, the higher the social value of higher education because of its relatively more sparse occurrence, the more enhanced is the difference between those with high education and those with low levels of education.
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The second claim relates to the set-up of the political economy. It is well known that coordinated market economies differ from liberal market economies in their focus on the provision of vocational instead of academic skills. The availability of VET improves access to educational resources for those in the lower half of the distribution of academic skills, contributing to a broader distribution of skills instead of promoting polarization between those with and without university education. Furthermore, the provision of VET often includes a significant degree of civic education. Historically, the establishment of high-quality VET hinges on the joint support of unions and employers (Thelen 2004) . In order to promote the skills of workers, union influence ensured the inclusion of general education subjects and civic education in the VET curriculum, which can be expected to have a positive impact on political participation of that education group. As before, above and beyond the resource effect, there might be important psychological and network effects at work: In coordinated market economies, those with a vocational education may be more conscious of their ability as political actors to influence political processes and outcomes. Joint experiences of political socialization, e.g. in apprenticeship training programs, could further contribute to the politicization of social networks built on the acquisition of vocational skills. All in all, thus, we would expect economic coordination to have a positive effect on the propensity to participate for those in the lower half of the skills distribution, i.e. with a background in vocational education.
Putting the pieces together, our paper could provide a micro-level story to the macrolevel association between VET and inequality identified by Estévez-Abe et al. (2001): The availability of VET boosts the political participation of low-income and low-skilled individuals, increasing overall levels of political participation and turnout, which has been shown to affect levels of redistribution (Mahler 2008) as well as the willingness of 8 left parties to cater to the interests of low-income workers instead of the median voter in the middle class (Rueda and Pontusson 2010; compare, however, Meltzer and Richard 1981) .
Data and methods
For the first and main analysis this paper (to follow in section 4), we rely on data from The macro-level data comes from various sources. To measure educational inequality, we rely on a recent indicator provided by the OECD as part of the PISA study (OECD 2010) . This measure captures the strength of the influence of parental background on educational performance, i.e. higher values indicate a stronger influence of parental background on performance and therefore higher levels of educational inequality or in other words a less meritocratic educational system. Data for public education spending is taken from the OECD Education Statistics database. Socio-economic inequality is the Gini index provided in the Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset (Solt 2009 ).
The degree of economic coordination is the measure developed by Hall and Gingerich 9 (2009) . We use their indicator of coordination in labor relations instead of the measure of coordination in corporate governance, because labor relations are closer to the education system. As an alternative, we used the Hall-Gingerich index of overall economic coordination developed in Hall and Gingerich (2004) , but this does not make a difference. Finally, we include a measure of general willingness to participate (average level of electoral turnout), which is an aggregate measure of the individual-level responses to the turnout question.
Our general empirical strategy is to use a two-step procedure to estimate the impact of macro-level contexts on the strength of micro-level associations (Lewis/Linzer 2005) . In the first step, we regress individual participation in elections on a set of common control variables for each country. The sample is restricted to respondents younger than 40, because we are interested in the effects of educational institutions on political participation, which will be most relevant for younger age cohorts and, also, because of the differential impact of education by age group due to the substitute effect of life experience for education (Wolfinger/Rosenstone 1980; Goerres 2009 ). The total number of countries in the dataset is 43, although this number is reduced significantly in the second step since we are only interested in and have macro-level data for advanced industrial democracies.
The dependent variable in the first step, propensity to vote, is provided by the following question: "If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?"
The answer is coded simply in binary terms (yes/no). The set of controls we use is gender, age and income (mean-imputed). In addition, the marginal effect/s of educational background lie at the center of interest. Here, an important issue for discussion is whether we should concentrate on the total level of individual human capital (measured in years of education, highest degree obtained, etc.) or whether one needs to distinguish between different kinds of education (academic/vocational). We opted in favor of the latter approach, although this necessarily correlates to a certain extent with the total level of individual human capital. The reason is that we would like to distinguish between the individual impact of a vocationally oriented education on the one hand and the effects of the context on the other (and how context mediates the individual-level impact of vocational education).
The variable we use to measure individual educational background is based on a question asking respondents to name the highest level they have achieved in their education. The original variable is then recoded in a way that corresponds to the above mentioned CASMIN scheme, which yields the following categories: This variable is then re-coded by us into three categories: basic education (1, 2 and 3), vocational education (4, 7 and 10) and academic education (5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13) .
There are, of course, different ways of distinguishing between vocational and academic education. For example, it would also be possible to count vocational education on the tertiary level as vocational education. We tried different operationalizations, which does not fundamentally change the main findings, because the share of students enrolled in 11 vocational courses at the upper levels is relatively small. In sum, we distinguish between basic education (the baseline), vocational training and academic training.
In the second step of the analysis, we take the estimated coefficients from the first step of the OLS-analysis as dependent variables (we could also use predicted probabilities from a logit regression instead; results do not vary). 2 Because of our three categories, we end up with two dependent variables: the coefficient estimate for the effect of vocational education on participation (in each country) and the effect of academic education on participation. We also calculate a third dependent variable, which is simply the difference between the two.
In general, the macro-level analysis at the second step has to live with a small number of observations (15-18) due to data restrictions. Also, it is not a random sample of any population. Thus, we push for the limits of any regression approach with such a small N and treat significance as an arbitrary measure of the precision of the effect to describe the data at hand.
Empirical analysis with the European Values Survey
Describing the variation of the dependent variable of the macro-level analysis Reading example for the first two columns: the predicted probability of voting is 48 % higher for those with vocational training compared with those with basic training in Germany; the predicted probability for those with academic training is 52.5 % higher than for those with basic training in Germany. On average the likelihood of voting for those with vocational training is 12.4 % higher than those with only basic education. For academic training, the likelihood is on average 15.9 % higher. In most countries, the effect of academic education is stronger than the effect of vocational education, although there are some exceptions to this pattern (e.g.
France, Sweden). Furthermore, the relative difference between those with a vocational and those with an academic education varies significantly across countries. On average, the "participation gap" between those with little and those with vocational education is much larger than that between the latter and those with academic training. These findings largely correspond to the main arguments in the literature cited above, but adds the important observation the educational inequalities are important in addition to socio-economic inequality, at least when we look at the impact of education on participation. In fact, the regression in tables 1 and 2 show that in this particular case, educational inequalities are more important than socio-economic inequality. Compared to educational inequality, the coefficient of the Gini variable is not robust across model specifications. In models 3 and 4 of tables 1 and 2, respectively, we excluded the VoC variable in order to increase the number of cases from 15 to 18. The coefficient estimate of educational inequality remains positive and statistically significant. So, in countries in which educational attainment is more dependent on your personal background, those who do have higher levels of education are also more likely to participate in politics compared to those with low levels of education.
Multiple regression results at the macro level
We also look at other control variables: the level of public education spending and the general level of political participation. Higher levels of public education spending could
indicate a more open and less exclusive education system. Thus, we would expect a negative, inequality-reducing effect (i.e. less differences across educational categories).
The sign of the coefficient estimate fits this expectation, but the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, we would expect a negative effect of electoral turnout: high levels of turnout should also by design depress differences between individuals. Again, we do not find a robust and statistically significant effect of this variable.
The final step in our analysis is to use a third variable: the difference between the size of the coefficient of academic education and the coefficient of vocational education. This variable indicates the "participatory head-start" that someone with an academic education has over someone with a vocational education (the common base category is still "basic education"). In this set-up, the electoral turnout variable has a strong negative effect: Higher levels of participation level out the differences across categories of education. This is both trivial and substantively interesting. The more people participate in voting, the less any variable can explain inter-individual differences because these differences diminish in size. Thus, if a policy-maker wanted to eradicate the gap between those with vocational and academic training with regard to participation, increasing turnout overall is still the most viable strategy.
The Gini variable, surprisingly, has a negative effect as well as does the educational inequality variable, which fails to reach statistical significance. Confirming our previous findings, higher levels of economic coordination are associated with lower differences between academically and vocationally educated individuals, although the effect is not statistically significant across all model specifications.
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Robustness check with a different data set (European Social Survey) and different ways of operationalization
In order to check the robustness of our core findings, we perform a similar analysis using a different dataset and different ways to operationalize: the accumulated European Social Survey waves from 2002 to 2008. In contrast to the EVS data, the measuring of educational background on the micro level is less fine-grained in this case.
Furthermore, for the macro-level variables, we use more narrowly defined indicators of the vocational specificity of the education and training system: the share of students that receive vocational training; the overall spending on education and the share of adults in the population with at least an upper secondary education degree. Lastly, the dependent variable at the micro level represents the answers to a question of actual behavior and not their propensity to vote.
We again use a two-step multilevel approach to find out whether there are cross-level interaction effects between the micro and the macro level and save the coefficients of high education (16 and more years of formal education) versus low education (10 and less years) and its standard errors. This dependent variable is thus presumably most comparable to the academic training inequality measure of before; but note that this time it is for all age cohorts. Thus, each measure of inequality is the difference in percentage points to have voted in the last national election between those with high and those with low levels of education. We do this 96 times for all country-year surveys of the accumulated ESS wave 1-4 data set. We create a new data matrix that only includes these 96 observations of each of the four dependent variables. For ease of interpretation, we multiply the original estimate with 100. Now the estimates can be read as differences in percentage points. Thus, the measure for voting inequality varies between 0.8 and 40.4, i.e. in some countries the difference in voting participation related 24 to differences in education is only 0.8 whereas in others it is 40.4 percentage points. The inequalities are always positive, i.e. higher educated are always more likely to participate (see figure 5) , a different finding from the EVS analysis where we also found negative differences, for example, for Finland. 3 Figure 5 is a graphical representation of our dependent variable. We display the variation across countries as well as changes across time (between 2002 and 2008) . In general, these inequalities are rather sticky -observations from the same country are very similar across time, a finding we could not gauge from the cross-sectional EVS alone. Some countries such as Belgium or Italy exhibit rather low education-related inequalities, whereas in others, they are very high (e.g. in Germany, Poland and Hungary). Not surprisingly, we expect those countries with compulsory voting among the low-inequality countries, be it with strong enforcement (Belgium) or weak enforcement (Italy, Greece, Cyprus). However, Luxembourg with weak enforcement is much further up the line than these four. Among the high-inequality countries, quite a few post-communist countries can be found. Here, our preferred estimation technique is Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) in which the standard errors of the estimates of the first step are used to adjust the weight of each observation in the regression (Lewis and Linzer 2005) . FGLS has some advantage over common Weighted Least Square Regression as not the full level of error of the dependent variable in step 2 is assumed to lie in the sampling error from step 1.
Since we often have several observations per country, we correct the standard errors by clustering per country. Compared to the other variables measuring institutional characteristics of the education system, the vocational training share has the most explanatory power. The general level of public education spending does not reduce education-related inequalities in participation, nor does the share of the population with at least an upper secondary education degree. The latter is somewhat surprising. The distribution of educational certificates among the population could be expected to matter more with regard to education-related inequalities in voting, because it captures the current distribution of human capital in the population. The vocational training share in the upper secondary education system, in contrast, has a strong impact on the future distribution of different kinds of human capital in society. A potential explanation could be that the population share variable is a poor proxy of the actual distribution of skills in the political economy, and the current vocational training share in upper secondary education is a superior alternative as education systems do not change significantly in that respect over time.
Still, more research needs to be done to clear up this point.
Also, the effect of the Gini index in this analysis is different from our previous findings:
Above, we found a positive effect, i.e. an inequality enhancing effect. Here, the effect of the Gini index is negative, reducing the stratifying impact of educational background on participation. Independent of the fact that this finding is hard to understand from a theoretical point of view, it could simply indicate that the impact of the Gini index is not as robust as the impact of educational inequality in the analysis above.
6. Summary and conclusions
The preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from our empirical analysis can be summarized in two theses: Frist, there is a large variation across countries with regard to the impact of educational background on the individual propensity to vote. Second, the institutional set-up of the education and training system as well as the political economy in general have an effect on the strength of the relationship between educational background and voting. Higher levels of educational inequality exacerbate the impact of educational background on political participation. Furthermore, the stratifying impact of educational inequality is much stronger than the impact of socioeconomic inequality when we look at the micro-level association between educational background and participation instead of the association between income and participation as is usually done in the pertinent literature. High levels of economic coordination boost the impact of vocational education on participation. In line with our expectations, the propensity to participate in elections for those with low-to mediumlevel vocational skills is higher in coordinated than in liberal market economies.
However, coordination also has a positive impact on the electoral participation of the highly educated, although the magnitude of this effect is smaller than in the case of those with a vocational education.
